Being Watched: What Drives Mass Attitudes AI Surveillance?

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Abstract

Governments increasingly make use of new surveillance technologies powered by artificial intelligence. These technologies, such as facial recognition and collection of personal data, offer many benefits, but also generate multiple concerns prompting calls for scrutiny and new forms of regulation. Yet overregulation of new technology can stifle innovation, and advocates of surveillance argue the benefits to society far outweigh the dangers. To better understand how prominent concerns about the technology impact individuals' preferences for government regulation, we conducted survey experiments in the United States and United Kingdom — two countries where AI surveillance technology is very common yet with different political cultures, histories with surveillance, and geopolitical positions. We presented respondents with some simple background information about AI surveillance, then randomized paragraph-long primes summarizing concerns about the technology that have been raised by think tanks, interest groups, and the media. Our analysis finds that concerns that Chinese surveillance technology presents a national security threat are especially salient in the U.S., while concerns about targeted surveillance for public safety may spill over into more routine surveillance resonate in the U.K. We also identify partisan and cross-country differences with respect to regulatory preferences.

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In May 2025, the Washington Post reported that the New Orleans police department had used facial recognition technology to surveil the city streets and scan for suspects over a two-year period, *in secret*, and *seemingly in violation* of a City Council ordinance prohibiting general surveillance and limiting the use of facial recognition to the searches for violent offenders.[1]. Although the program led to some arrests, the use of facial recognition technology was not disclosed or included in reporting to the City Council, which was mandated by a previous ordinance.

This episode raises a fundamental question about the use of emerging technology in society: how should governing authorities balance privacy and other concerns, such as the potential for racial bias, with the potential to increase safety and punish society's worst offenders. The AI revolution has enabled significant technological advancement in the ability to surveil individuals and groups. Cameras equipped with AI technology can now autonomously identify individuals and behaviors and private information is collected in staggering amounts. Both governments and private entities use this technology for securing borders, pattern recognition and predictive policing, identifying individuals engaging in acts of civil disobedience, and targeted advocacy and commercial campaigns. Yet this technology has sparked considerable concern about the potential for nefarious use of private information, discriminatory policy, and even foreign political interference.

Technology optimists often argue that despite these concerns, overregulation of new AI technologies will stifle innovation. And these concerns about citizen rights intersect in some ways with globalization and foreign economic policy. For instance, two Chinese companies alone, Hikvision and Dahua, account for about 40% of the world's surveillance cameras, and Chinese surveillance technology can be found in at least 80 countries around the world, including the United States, according to the Center for International and Strategic Studies.[2] The ubiquity of Chinese technology has prompted major security concerns within the United States, as evidenced by the recent Congressional bill forcing Tiktok's parent company, ByteDance, to sell the platform to American owners or be banned within the United States.[3] Chinese companies are also market rivals to US AI companies, which means these geopolitical security concerns are layered atop the two countries' competition for market dominance in this fast-moving and lucrative sector.

Despite many new privacy laws at the national, subnational, and even supranational level in the case of the EU, we know relatively little about what concerns are most salient for specific groups within society and which issues surrounding AI surveillance drive support for government regulation. We engaged this debate by analyzing the results of survey experiments in the U.S. and U.K., two countries with overlapping but

[1] Douglas MacMillan and Aaron Schaffer, "Police secretly monitored New Orleans with facial recognition cameras," *The Washington Post* 19 May 2025.

[2] See Mapping China's Silk Road

[3] At the time of this writing the Trump Administration has, however, placed a moratorium on enforcement of that Congressional mandate.

distinct geopolitical conditions that differ in terms of the history and prevalence of video surveillance and overall political attitudes toward regulating the private sector. Our experimental design was simple: after providing some brief background information on AI surveillance, we randomized exposure to short statements pertaining to (1) the prevalence of Chinese surveillance technology, (2) the potential that overregulation will stifle innovation, (3) the possibility that targeted use may become more widespread, (4) the possibility that AI-equipped surveillance might be used against peaceful protesters and civil society, (5) reports of bias and discrimination in the use of facial recognition, (6) the usefulness of the technology for criminal justice and border safety, and (7) that some uses of AI surveillance may contradict privacy protections embedded in international human rights law. We also included a control group for baseline comparison. We outline expectations for each of these priming treatments below. We further hypothesized that our treatments would be moderated by respondent partisanship, with those on the left responding more to prompts about bias and discrimination, oppression of civil society, and human rights concerns, and those on the right finding prompts about security uses, stifling innovation, and the threat from Chinese surveillance more salient.

We also created an index to reflect perceptions of discrimination and examined how preexisting feelings of discrimination and alienation moderate the central treatments. And finally, we also predicted cross-country differences in comfort with surveillance and the appetite for government regulation, with UK respondents more willing to support government regulation in general. We examine the effects of these treatments on several outcomes of interest, including willingness to ban foreign surveillance technology, support for establishing a nationwide bureaucracy to protect privacy rights in the use of surveillance, and support for passing national laws to govern the use of AI-enabled surveillance. We also measured concern about AI technology on a scale of 1 (least concerned) to 10 (most-concerned) pre and post-treatment, then analyze treatment effects on the change in level of concern.

Many — but not all — of these expectations, are borne out in the data, which we expand in detail upon below. Several results stand out: First, all treatments have the expected effect on change in concern about AI surveillance, and most of these effects are statistically significanct. Second, prompting respondents with information and concerns about Chinese surveillance technology moved respondents across multiple outcome questions in the United States, whereas in the United Kingdom this concern appears less salient. Third, concern about creeping expansion of surveillance appears most salient in the U.K. And our findings also display predictable partisan differences with respect to treatments that focus on the security benefits of surveillance or the possibility that overregulation may stifle technological advancement.

Taken together, our findings help map the contours of public debates about AI technology and privacy. As this technology progresses, attitudes and norms will change regarding its appropriate use and the role of governments in regulating that use. Public opinion — and the forces that shape it – will be important parts

of this norm evolution process.

Background

Surveillance in the public sphere is not a new phenomenon. For instance, the London police began using CCTV surveillance in the early 1960s, and its use became commonplace in the UK and elsewhere in Europe in the following decades. In the U.S., the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks resurrected debates over the tradeoffs between privacy and security. The federal government adopted the controversial Patriot Act in late October 2001, which authorized law enforcement agencies to adopt new and sometimes intrusive surveillance techniques. Surveillance technology developed and diversified over time. Cameras with the ability to record video and take photos became widespread, accompanying traffic lights, retail stores, and even unmanned aerial vehicles or drones patrolling border areas or conflict zones.

Surveillance technology has become "supercharged" with the rapid development of AI technology. Cameras now often come equipped with automated systems that can collect and process data (including in real-time) to "monitor, identify, track, regulate, predict, prescribe, prevent and steer individuals' or groups' (behavior)" (Fontes et al., 2022). AI algorithms have also proved useful to automate face recognition, which is now widely used in airports, city streets, and even at polling stations. In this paper, we use the term"AI Surveillance" to refer to AI video surveillance cameras with abilities like those mentioned above. While we are especially concerned about government use of the technology, our experimental design also includes reference to private uses.

The AI Global Surveillance (AIGS) Index compiles data on AI surveillance use for 176 countries across the world, and finds that at least 75 out of these 176 countries uses AI surveillance in some form (Feldstein, 2019). The AIGS Index classifies AI surveillance into 3 types. First, smart cities/safe cities are defined as "cities with sensors that transmit real-time data to facilitate service delivery, city management, and public safety". For example, Singapore has been named a top "smart city" for using technology and AI surveillance to improve standards of living, transportation, health care, and public safety [4].

Second, facial recognition is defined as "biometric technology that uses cameras to match stored or live footage of individuals with images from databases...assess aggregate demographic trends or conduct broader sentiment analysis via facial recognition crowd scanning". This technology is now widespread; many individuals utilize some form of facial recognition to unlock their personal devices, while some governments are even experimenting with facial recognition as a form of identification for voting (Allie, 2023).

And third, smart policing is defined as "data-driven analytic technology used to facilitate investigations

[4]See Singapore: World's Smartest City

and police response...make predictions about future crimes." The United Arab Emirates (UAE), specifically Dubai, has championed the use of facial recognition technology for public safety wherein the Dubai police can pull the identity of anyone that passes in front of any of its 10,000 cameras across the city. Among other initiatives, the Dubai police also use predictive policing to identify potential targets for robberies,and assign specific patrol routes to police on the ground based on crime data [5].

Other examples of applications of AI surveillance include the social credit system implemented by China - wherein AI surveillance is used to monitor citizens' behavior (such as adherence to traffic rules, financial behavior, social interactions) to assign "scores" that impact access to benefits like loans or job opportunities (Liang et al., 2018), or Russia's implementation of facial recognition technologies to not just maintain public safety, but also curb protests and dissent against the government [6]. Overall, governments of autocratic, or semi-autocratic countries are more likely to exploit or abuse AI surveillance technologies for mass surveillance or targeted repression (Feldstein, 2019)). However, according to the AIGS Index, liberal democracies also make frequent use of AI surveillance (about 51% of advanced democracies employ AI surveillance systems) (Feldstein, 2019). For instance, London's Metropolitan Police — an early adopter of CCTV for security purposes — uses live facial recognition technology to identify and apprehend criminals. South Korea uses smart policing to detect criminal activity (Moon et al., 2017). And New York City uses over 15,000 cameras equipped with facial recognition to help with police searches [7].

Regime type is not necessarily a strong predictor of which states implement AI surveillance; the technology is now ubiquitous. Moreover, while some states deliberately use AI surveillance to further repression, discriminate against minorities, or conduct mass monitoring of their populations, not all AI surveillance usages are inherently "evil". In fact, most justifications for AI surveillance applications include enhancing quality of life, improving efficiency of urban systems, or increasing public safety or security. And so, especially in democracies, where mass perceptions and public opinion play a great deal of influence in policy outcomes, factors such as origins of AI technology, justifications for its implementation, and the discussion of privacy and human rights concerns shape norms around its usage. Understanding what concerns resonate most, and how they shape attitudes about legal constraints on AI surveillance, is important for assessing the public mood and for predicting the future of AI surveillance regulation.

[5] See The Spread of Police Surveillance Tech
[6] See this Special Report by Reuters
[7] See London Facial Recognition, New York Surveillance

Geopolitics

The debate over AI in general, and its application in various forms of government and private surveillance, has been closely intertwined with geopolitics. Governments that control access to new technologies wield considerable power, and digital globalization has increasingly made it possible to weaponize technology or use it as a "Trojan horse" to undermine rival governments or attack cyber infrastructure (Farrell and Newman (2019b), Farrell and Newman (2019a), Weymouth (2023), Akoto (2021)). Within the U.S., rhetoric over the U.S. trade gap with China has added to the politicization of technology competition between the two countries (e.g. Kerner et al. (2020), Schweinberger (2022)). A 2021 report by the Pew Research Center found that "roughly nine-in-ten U.S. adults (89%) consider China a competitor or enemy, rather than a partner"[8] Although some official rhetoric toward China softened during the Biden Administration, several high-profile events prior to our summer 2024 survey have brought concerns about Chinese technology to the fore.

According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, China is a major supplier of AI surveillance technology worldwide. Over 80 countries import and use Chinese AI surveillance technology, a number that rose dramatically in the past 15 years (Greitens (2020)). This trend has coincided with Chinese efforts to expand its economic reach through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As many as half the countries importing Chinese surveillance technology are members of the BRI (ibid). Not only is China an exporter of surveillance technology, it also makes considerable use of AI surveillance technology, use that has increased under the more authoritarian rule of Xi Jinping. During Covid, in particular, the degree of surveillance of its own citizens increased markedly (Huang and Tsai (2022)).

Concerns in the U.S. about intrusive surveillance technology imported from China are twofold. First, given the pervasiveness of surveillance within China, the adoption of similar technologies and systems within the U.S. could lead to overly intrusive collection of personal data that puts individual privacy at risk.[9] Second, some see the expansion of the BRI, and the diffusion of Chinese technology exports — including AI surveillance technology — as a geopolitical strategy to challenge the U.S. and the West. Not only will the expansion of Chinese business into BRI countries increase China's leverage worldwide, but some fear the technologies themselves could be manipulated for political purposes. In particular, Chinese technology in critical infrastructure systems could be used to disrupt or even cripple some types of service provision, and the collection of personal information and control of platforms like TikTok could be used to interfere in U.S. elections (Cheney (2019)).

[8] Laura Silver, Kat Devlin, and Christine Huang, "Most Americans Support Tough Stance Toward China on Human Rights, Economic Issues," Pew Research Center 4 March 2021 Most Americans Support Tough Stance Toward China.

[9] This concern is not limited to the U.S. In April 2025 India imposed far-reaching regulations on imported surveillance systems, requiring manufacturers to submit software, hardware, and source code for inspection by the Indian Government (Aditya Kalra, "India's Alarm over Chinese Spying Rocks the Surveillance Industry," *Reuters* 28 May 2025.)

For these reasons, we expect priming respondents with a short piece of information about the prevalence of Chinese AI surveillance technologies will generate concern about the technology in general. British public attitudes toward China also turned more negative in recent years, especially during the Covid-19 pandemic (Summers et al. (2022)), and the government has taken steps to limit the usage of surveillance technology from Chinese producers. In November 2022 the British government decided that surveillance technology produced by companies subject to China's National Intelligence Law should be removed from sensitive sites including government buildings and military bases. In October 2024, over 50 % of surveillance cameras produced by Hikvision had been removed, with full removal due by April 2025.[10] An amendment to the Investigatory Powers Act passed in 2024 allows the Home Department to require domestic and foreign producers of surveillance technology to disclose changes to their security or encryption protocols. At the same time, the law gave law enforcement officials wide latitude to collect data on British citizens,[11] raising concerns from rights groups like the NGO Big Brother Watch.

Experimental Design

During July of 2024, we contracted with YouGov to conduct a pre-registered online experiment in the U.S. and U.K., with 1,000 respondents from each country. We sampled adults age 18 and over. Our experimental design was simple: after providing a brief statement about AI surveillance, we randomly assigned respondents into seven treatment groups and one control group. The treatments consisted of brief statements discussing commonly raised issues surrounding AI surveillance technology. To maximize consistency across treatments and to avoid biases due to "latent" treatment effects (Fong and Grimmer (2023)), we made the statements a similar length, each ending with a summary statement attributed to an anonymous "expert" or "experts." The resulting treatments are therefore shorter than the typical experimental vignette, but consistent with vignette-style survey experiments.

The statement presented to respondents prior to receiving any treatment read as follows :

> *Government and private sector entities now commonly use artificial intelligence with video surveillance to view, record, or store images. This creates the possibility of more sophisticated surveillance that can autonomously identify people and objects and utilize advanced analytics and predictions to process data.*

[10] "Chinese-made surveillance kit to be removed from sensitive sites by 2025, says UK," *Reuters* 29 April 2024; Ashish Dangwal, "UK Removes 50 % Of Chinese CCTV Cameras From Sensitive Sites Amid Growing Security Concerns," *The Eurasian Times* 23 October 2024.

[11] Meredith Broadbent, "A New Investigatory Powers Act in the United Kingdom Enhances Government Surveillance Powers," the Center for Strategic and International Studies 20 May 2024

In a moment, we will present you with some additional information about AI surveillance, then ask you several questions about the use of this technology.

Respondents were then randomly assigned one of the following treatments. A control group received no treatment, and serves as the baseline for our first set of comparisons. These statements are intended to cover most commonly cited arguments both for and against the use of AI-enhanced surveillance. We used a variety of report from think tanks, distilling the key issues into digestible paragraph statements. In each case we added bold emphasis to a portion of the statement in order to underscore the core issue the statement conveyed. We refer to these treatments by the term in parentheses at the beginning of each item; these terms were not provided with the treatment respondents read.

- (Human Rights) Many types of AI surveillance may be inconsistent with countries' obligations under international law. Article 12 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights state, "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with their privacy, family, or personal life. Some experts suggest that **surveillance equipped with AI capabilities, such as facial and pattern recognition, could be a violation of international law**.

- (Mission Creep) Authorities often justify the use of surveillance technologies in exceptional, and narrow, circumstances. Some worry that targeted uses of AI surveillance may lead to widespread, rather than specific use of the technology. One expert recently noted, **"exceptional justifications for the use of surveillance technologies often turn into mundane regular use," which could lead to intrusions of privacy**.

- (Security justification) Many governments use AI tools to police borders, apprehend potential criminals, monitor citizens for bad behavior, and pull out suspected terrorists from crowds. Such uses can potentially make towns and cities safer. One expert noted **"AI surveillance has the potential to dramatically increase the safety of our cities and borders."**

- (China) China is a major driver of AI surveillance worldwide. Technology linked to Chinese companies—particularly Huawei, Hikvision, Dahua, and ZTE—supply AI surveillance technology in sixty-three countries, including the United States. Experts warn that **"producers of AI surveillance technologies have close ties with the Chinese government,"** adding that such ties mean that surveillance technology from Chinese producers might be used to further the goals of the Chinese government.

- (Civil Society) surveillance allows law enforcement to monitor and identify protesters and journalists, raising questions about whether it threatens fundamental freedoms. Experts warn that such surveillance may **"unjustifiably or arbitrarily restrict citizens' rights to freely express political opinions."**

- (Bias and Discrimination) Facial recognition is sometimes unreliable, especially under conditions such as bad weather or low image quality. Facial recognition also has been unable to fully eliminate consistent gender and racial biases, which lead to elevated false positives for minorities and women. Some experts state that **"facial recognition technology is not currently reliable enough to ethically justify its use."**

- (Stifling Innovation) AI surveillance has the potential to deliver many positive benefits to society. It may be used across a range of industries and for several different purposes. Yet some experts note that **"unduly burdensome regulation might stifle innovation and development."** Regulation could also deter new developers from entry into the industry.

Prior to seeing any treatment, we asked respondents to rate their concern about the use of AI surveillance technology on a scale of 1-10, with 1 indicating no concern and 10 indicating maximal concern. After treatment, we again asked respondents, with the exception of the control group, to indicate their level of concern on a salce of 1-10. We then compare the difference in level of concern across treatment groups.

We also sought to understand how priming individuals with these issues would affect their support for government intervention to regulate AI surveillance usage and technology. There is considerable evidence that policy-makers are responsive to public opinion.[12] We therefore asked the following post-treatment questions:[13]

1. Do you support the creation of a federal(national) independent oversight agency to monitor local law enforcement's and local governments' use of AI surveillance? (*Strongly Oppose, Oppose, Don't know, Support, Strongly Support*)

2. Do you agree or disagree: the federal (national) government should limit imports of surveillance technology produced in other countries? (*Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Don't know, Agree, Strongly Agree*)

3. Do you agree or disagree: Congress(Parliament) should pass a comprehensive set of rules regarding appropriate use of AI Surveillance? (*Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Don't know, Agree, Strongly Agree*)

[12] See Wlezien and Soroka (2016) for a review.
[13] Words in parentheses indicate adaptations for the U.K. survey.

We expect the two primings labeled "stifling innovation" and "security justification" to have a negative effect on respondents' support for additional limits and regulations on surveillance technology. We expect all other treatments to push respondents to be more supportive of additional regulation and limits on surveillance technology and to display less trust in the technology post-treatment.[14]

The remainder of the survey collected demographic data, but two specific items are important to mention prior to displaying results. The first asked for self-reported partyid, with the typical categories of Democrat, Independent, and Republican in the U.S., and Conservative, Labour, Independent and Liberal Democrat in the UK.[15]

Second, we asked several questions aimed at measuring perceptions of discrimination and vulnerability in society. The first asked: "*Have you ever experienced discrimination because of your ethnicity, race, or gender?* (*yes, no, prefer not to say.* The second asked respondents "Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statement: "regardless of who is in political power, things are generally pretty bad for people like me." Respondents could choose answers ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." The third asked "Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statement: "people with my characteristics are often discriminated against in this country," with answers again ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." We expect respondents that report directly experiencing discrimination or who hold perceptions that people like them are discriminated against or generally subordinated within society to exhibit stronger treatment effects for the "human rights," "mission creep," and "bias and discrimination" treatments. Studies elsewhere find that marginalized segments of the population are often opposed to new technologies, particularly if they might result in job displacement or discrimination (Alez-Rostani (2023)). Vulnerable citizens, or those that perceive vulnerability due to observable differences, may be especially wary of technologies like facial recognition (Allie (2023)) We therefore examine treatment effects according to respondents' answers to the above question and by party ID, as well as main treatment effects.

To summarize, we expect our treatments to generate more concern about the use of AI-enabled surveillance, with the exceptions of the "stifling innovation" treatment the "security justification" treatments. These latter two emphasize the benefits of surveillance and warn against overregulation. We further expect treatment effects to be moderated by partisanship and ideology, on the one hand, and by perceptions of vulnerability and discrimination, on the other.

We selected our two country cases on the basis of theoretically-relevant and context specific characteristics. As noted above, the importation of Chinese surveillance technology has become highly politicized in the

[14]We also administered a manipulation check, in which we asked respondents to identify the key issue mentioned in the treatment they received from a list of multiple choices. We use this to estimate ATT's, or the average treatment effect on the treated. The results are consistent with the estimate ATE's and available upon request.

[15]We included several other options in the UK survey but the vast majority of respondents fell into the above categories. We also administered a self-reported ideology question, which is highly correlated with partyid.

U.S., while at the same time mundane uses of AI-enabled features like facial recognition have become quite common. Municipal, state, and federal law enforcement agencies have put AI surveillance to use in a variety of contexts, the legality of which is sometimes questionable.

The U.K. has long employed CCTV technology for enhanced safety and security, dating back to the 1960s. Its usage expanded during the 1980s, but due to its prevalence several laws limiting its use have been adopted. These include the 1998 Data Protection Act, the 2012 Protection of Freedoms Act, and the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Thus, UK citizens are more familiar with many of the debates about surveillance highlighted by our treatments.

Results

We first present linear coefficient estimates from an OLS model with change in concern about AI surveillance technology as the dependent variable.[16] Figure 1 displays these estimates. The "security justification" treatment results in a negative change, or reduction, in concern about AI surveillance, though is not statistically significant in the U.S sample. The "stifling innovation" treatment seems to also reduce concern, though the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant. All other treatments lead to statistically significant increases in concern about AI surveillance, consistent with our expectations. The exception is that the "mission creep" treatment narrowly misses statistical significance in the U.K. sample, but appears in the expected direction.

[16] Full coefficient results appear in the supplemental appendix.

Figure 1: Linear Coefficients, Change in Concern about AI Surveillance



Moving to examining support for specific types of regulation, we first present treatment effects in the pooled and individual country samples, then consider subgroup analysis by party ID and by perceptions of discrimination. Figure 4 shows linear coefficients from an OLS model with country fixed effects for our treatments, relative to the pure control group, across our three dependent variables: support for the creation of federal/national oversight agency to monitor local law enforcement's and local governments' use of AI surveillance; support for the federal/national government limiting imports of surveillance technology produced in other countries; and support for Congress/Parliament passing a comprehensive set of rules regarding appropriate use of AI surveillance. Figures **??** and **??** show average treatment effects for the U.S. and U.K. samples, respectively.

Figure 2: Linear Coefficients by Outcome, Pooled Sample



Figure 3: ATEs by Outcome, US Sample







Figure 4: ATEs by Outcome, UK Sample







When the two samples are pooled, the treatments are statistically insignificant, with mixed results with respect to direction of effect. However, support for government intervention in the U.S. is consistently, and significantly, lower in the U.S. than in the U.K. This suggests the context of the two samples is highly relevant; individuals in the U.S. are generally more reluctant to support federal government actions to address concerns about surveillance technology.

When we analyze the samples independently, two patterns emerge: first, the China priming tends to be highly influential the U.S. sample. Respondents who read the statement discussing Chinese production of surveillance technology were significantly more likely favor creating an independent federal oversight body, passing comprehensive federal privacy rules, and limiting imports of surveillance technology. News coverage in the U.S. of concern over Chinese espionage, including efforts to limit Chinese access to AI technology or suspicions that popular platforms like TikTok with Chinese ownership have improperly gathered private information from users, seems to have increased the salience of this concern.

The only other treatment effect that reached conventional levels statistical significance in the U.S. sample was the security justification treatment, which made respondents less supportive of Congress passing a comprehensive set of federal privacy rules or limiting imports. The security justification treatment narrowly misses statistical significance but decreases support for creating a federal oversight agency.

In the UK, on the other hand, the "mission creep" treatment made respondents more likely to support creating a national oversight body, passing comprehensive national privacy rules, and limiting imports on surveillance technology. This treatment stands out as consistently positive and statistically significant. This finding echoes long-standing debates about the widespread use of CCTV surveillance in the UK. Although U.K. citizens may have become use to the ubiquity of CCTV cameras, the idea that surveillance, aiding by AI algorithms, might gradually creep into areas beyond public safety is a salient concern.

The "human rights" and "use against civil society" treatments made U.K. respondents less likely to support a ban on imports of surveillance technology, and the "use against civil society" treatment made respondents less likely to support the passage of comprehensive laws governing local government's and law enforcement's use of surveillance technology. While these findings were unexpected, one interpretation, given the salience of the "mission creep" treatment, is that respondents primed by these messages were less trustful in their central government to adopt policies about appropriate use of surveillance. National authorities might have less control over imported technologies, and therefore would be less able to misuse that technology, and local respondents may trust their local governments and law enforcement more than the central government to not abuse surveillance technology.

Subgroup analysis by party ID

We turn now to two sets of subgroup analysis. First, we present difference of means across party id across the US and UK for our outcome measures. Figures 5, 6, and 7 shows difference of means tests in the U.S. sample. Several patterns stand out. First, across most, but not all, treatments, Democratic respondents are more in favor of creating a federal oversight agency. There is more agreement among partisans for the creation of comprehensive federal privacy laws, an idea that appeals both to small government conservative Republicans and more liberal Democratic respondents that highly value civil liberties. There is surprising little difference between partisans on limiting imports of surveillance technology.

Figure 5: US Difference of Means by Party ID, Oversight Outcome



Figure 6: US Difference of Means by Party ID, Pass Rules Outcome



Figure 7: US Difference of Means by Party ID, Limit Imports Outcome



Figures 8, 9, and 10 show the patterns across UK partisans for the same dependent variables. These results are much more mixed. Labour party respondents tend to be slightly more supportive of government regulation of AI surveillance, consistent with an ideological explanation for regulatory preferences, while Liberal Democrats show much more variance in attitudes, as shown in wider confidence intervals across most treatment groups. Liberal Democrats also display more support for a federal oversight body upon exposure to the treatment mentioning international human rights commitments, but much less supportive than other partisans when exposed to a treatment that describes potential use against civil society. In other cases, such as the treatment that describes the potential security benefits of AI surveillance, Liberal Democrats are surprising much more likely to support a regulatory body that might place limits on the technology's usage. We see similar variation with respect to the passage of comprehensive national privacy rules, with Labour respondents slightly more in favor of such rules than conservatives, and Liberal Democrats sometimes more in favor and sometimes less in favor, but with wider variance across almost all treatment groups.

Figure 8: UK Difference of Means by Party ID, Oversight Outcome



Figure 9: UK Difference of Means by Party ID, Pass Rules Outcome



Figure 10: UK Difference of Means by Party ID, Limit Imports Outcome



Subgroup analysis by discrimination perception

Finally, we turn to comparing means by treatment across respondents who rank on the high and low ends of the vulnerability spectrum. To capture vulnerability, we asked respondents whether they had experienced discrimination, whether they had been victims of crime, and whether they perceived discrimination. We asked two questions regarding personal experiences.

- Have you ever experienced discrimination because of your ethnicity, race, or gender? (Yes, no, prefer not to say)
- Have you ever been a victim of a violent crime? (Yes, no, prefer not to say)

To measure perceptions of discrimination, we asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement with three statements using a Likert scale: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree, don't know. The statements are:

- "My values are not respected in this country."
- "Regardless of who is in political power, things are generally pretty bad for people like me."
- "People with my characteristics are often discriminated against in this country."

We aim to generate an encompassing index to capture a general sense of vulnerability related to crimes and discrimination. For questions related to personal experiences, responses of 'Yes' were coded as one, while all other answers were coded as 0. For perception-related questions, we coded 'strongly agree' and 'agree' as 1, and all other responses were coded as 0. We then summed the values across the five questions and split the sample into high and low groups based on the median. In the U.S. sample, 523 respondents scored 1 or higher on the vulnerability index, while 476 scored 0. In the UK sample, 564 respondents were categorized as high (scoring 1 or higher), and 436 respondents were in the low group.

Figures 11, 12, and 13 show these patterns for the U.S. sample. Recall that we predicted that individuals that perceive discrimination against them will be generally more wary of surveillance technology, especially upon being primed by treatments that mention unreliability and discrimination, use against civil society, and human rights obligations. We find partial support for these expectations within the U.S., though the difference in support between those who report discrimination and those that do not is sometimes relatively small. Those that report discrimination are more likely to support passing a comprehensive set of privacy rules and a federal oversight agency upon being primed by information about unreliability and discrimination. However, individuals who report discrimination and were exposed to the human rights treatment were less

likely to support a federal oversight agency — perhaps over distrust of state institutions — but more likely to support Congressional passage of comprehensive privacy laws.

Figure 11: Support for Creating a Federal Oversight Agency by Treatment and Discrimination Status, US Sample



Figure 12: Support for Passage of Comprehensive Privacy Laws by Treatment and Discrimination Status, US Sample



Figure 13: Support for Limiting Imports of Surveillance Technology by Treatment and Discrimination Status, US Sample



Figures 14, 15, 16 show corresponding figures using the UK sample. These results are more mixed. Individuals who reported experiencing discrimination in the UK are sometimes more likely than those who did not to favor the creation of a national oversight agency and sometimes less likely. The same is true with respect to support for the passage of comprehensive national privacy rules or limiting imports of surveillance technology. Perhaps strangely, those exposed to the treatment that discusses the potential for stifling innovation and who reported experiencing discrimination were significantly more likely to favor passing national privacy rules and creating a national oversight body, and somewhat more likely to favor limiting imports. It's possible that those that feel discriminated against or marginalized in society are generally distrustful of surveillance technology generally, and favor limits on the rate of innovation.

Figure 14: Support for Creating a Federal Oversight Agency by Treatment and Discrimination Status, UK Sample



Figure 15: Support for Passage of Comprehensive Privacy Laws by Treatment and Discrimination Status, UK Sample



Figure 16: Support for Limiting Imports of Surveillance Technology by Treatment and Discrimination Status, UK Sample



In sum, our results show strong support for the geopolitical competition hypothesis in the U.S., but more support for fears of mission creep in the UK. Respondents in the UK were generally more likely to support government initiatives to regulate AI surveillance technology than their U.S. counterparts, though within each country, we observe predictable partisan differences with respect to regulation. We find partial support for the notion that feelings of discrimination or marginalization make individuals more suspicious of AI surveillance technology, though patterns vary somewhat across dependent variables

Conclusion

The rise of AI technology has transformed state and private actors' surveillance capabilities. Surveillance is now so pervasive and automated, many citizens don't know the extent to which their image and personal information is collected, or the degree to which a variety of behaviors are monitored by surveillance systems at the local, state, and national levels. The rapid advancement of AI surveillance technology has raised multiple concerns, yet we have very little evidence in political science about attitudes over regulating this technology.

We identified several factors that may influence attitudes and concerns about AI surveillance technology. The first is geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China. The great power rivalry between the U.S. and China is salient in the U.S., and our survey experiment confirms that when respondents are primed with information about Chinese exports of AI surveillance technology and the concerns associated, they are more likely to report deeper concern about the technology and support a number of regulatory initiatives. We also examined how information about international human rights obligations with respect to privacy, and how suggestions about other concerns with surveillance technology might generate heightened concern, particularly among vulnerable or marginalized populations. We found some evidence for this in the U.K., where the most consistent treatment was a statement that discussed whether target surveillance use might spillover into other areas of life. Respondents in the U.K. were also more likely to exhibit attitudinal movement for some outcomes after reading information about possible abuses of surveillance technology.

Our study speaks to several bodies of scholarship. First, it speaks to the causes of attitude formation in a relatively new technological area. Societies continue to grapple with how to harness the benefits of AI technology while limiting its potential harm. Public attitudes over appropriate use of the technology in surveillance are an important part of charting this process. Second, it speaks to how international factors and events, such as human rights obligations and geopolitical competition, may affect attitudes about policy within countries. Third, it connects to work on partisan and ideological differences over the appropriate use of surveillance technology. While this study broadly touches on these areas, future work should zero in on specific nuances of public opinion about AI surveillance technology.

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Appendix

Average Treatment Effect (ATE)

Table 1: US: Average Treatment Effects on Federal Oversight Agency (Q5)

Treatment	N	Mean	Differences	P Value	T Statistic
Security justification	129	3.558139	-0.12	0.3300341	-0.98
Unreliability & discrimination	129	3.612403	-0.07	0.6168498	-0.50
Human rights	119	3.613445	-0.07	0.6261486	-0.49
Use against civil society	126	3.523810	-0.16	0.2358585	-1.19
China prompt	131	3.908397	+0.23 *	0.0758751	1.78
Mission creep	122	3.598361	-0.08	0.5521880	-0.60
Stifling Innovation	122	3.696721	+0.02	0.9003173	0.13
Control group	122	3.680328	–	NA	NA

Table 2: US: Average Treatment Effects on Limiting Imports (Q6)

Treatment	N	Mean	Differences	P Value	T Statistic
Security justification	129	3.589147	-0.17	0.1435088	-1.47
Unreliability & discrimination	129	3.899225	+0.14	0.2783225	1.09
Human rights	119	3.722689	-0.04	0.7508630	-0.32
Use against civil society	126	3.833333	+0.07	0.5653223	0.58
China prompt	131	4.099237	+0.34 ***	0.0036813	2.93
Mission creep	122	3.795082	+0.03	0.8035869	0.25
Stifling Innovation	122	3.819672	+0.06	0.6462665	0.46
Control group	122	3.762295	–	NA	NA

Table 3: US: Average Treatment Effects on Passing Laws (Q8)

Treatment	N	Mean	Differences	P Value	T Statistic
Security justification	129	3.868217	-0.18 *	0.0852592	-1.73
Unreliability & discrimination	129	4.069767	+0.02	0.8541648	0.18
Human rights	119	4.016807	-0.03	0.7759592	-0.28
Use against civil society	126	4.055556	+0.01	0.9522723	0.06
China prompt	131	4.251908	+0.20 *	0.0600726	1.89
Mission creep	122	4.016393	-0.03	0.7771644	-0.28
Stifling Innovation	122	3.950820	-0.10	0.4074782	-0.83
Control group	122	4.049180	–	NA	NA

Table 4: OLS Regression Results: Change in Concern (US Sample)

Human rights	0.496**
	(0.217)
Mission creep	0.385*
	(0.215)
Security justification	−0.147
	(0.212)
China prompt	1.092***
	(0.212)
Use against civil society	0.492**
	(0.214)
Unreliability & discrimination	0.628***
	(0.212)
Stifling Innovation	0.508**
	(0.215)
Constant	0.000
	(0.152)
Observations	1,000
R^2	0.044
Adjusted R^2	0.037
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5: UK: Average Treatment Effects on Federal Oversight Agency (Q5)

Treatment	N	Mean	Differences	P Value	T Statistic
Stifling Innovation	124	3.967742	+0.04	0.6944622	0.39
Unreliability & discrimination	111	3.882883	-0.04	0.6971807	-0.39
Use against civil society	123	3.837398	-0.09	0.3999915	-0.84
Security justification	124	3.854839	-0.07	0.5165972	-0.65
China prompt	134	3.970149	+0.04	0.6643450	0.43
Mission creep	135	4.192593	+0.27 ***	0.0093191	2.62
Human rights	113	3.893805	-0.03	0.7632716	-0.30
Control group	136	3.926471	–	NA	NA

Table 6: UK: Average Treatment Effects on Limiting Imports (Q6)

Treatment	N	Mean	Differences	P Value	T Statistic
Stifling Innovation	124	3.943548	-0.04	0.7091633	-0.37
Unreliability & discrimination	111	3.981982	-0.00	0.9757312	-0.03
Use against civil society	123	3.756098	-0.23 **	0.0391057	-2.07
Security justification	124	3.725807	-0.26 **	0.0238472	-2.27
China prompt	134	3.925373	-0.06	0.5902173	-0.54
Mission creep	135	4.155556	+0.17 *	0.0909180	1.70
Human rights	113	3.787611	-0.20 *	0.0780746	-1.77
Control group	136	3.985294	–	NA	NA

Table 7: UK: Average Treatment Effects on Passing Laws (Q8)

Treatment	N	Mean	Differences	P Value	T Statistic
Stifling Innovation	124	4.274193	-0.05	0.6196400	-0.50
Unreliability & discrimination	111	4.378378	+0.05	0.5447043	0.61
Use against civil society	123	4.186992	-0.14	0.1636998	-1.40
Security justification	124	4.193548	-0.13	0.1651235	-1.39
China prompt	134	4.223881	-0.10	0.2600888	-1.13
Mission creep	135	4.503704	+0.18 **	0.0243443	2.27
Human rights	113	4.238938	-0.08	0.3937070	-0.85
Control group	136	4.323529	–	NA	NA

Table 8: OLS Regression Results: Change in Concern (UK Sample)

Human rights	0.540^{**}
	(0.216)
Mission creep	0.304
	(0.206)
Security justification	-0.685^{***}
	(0.210)
China prompt	1.082^{***}
	(0.206)
Use against civil society	0.463^{**}
	(0.211)
Unreliability & discrimination	0.667^{***}
	(0.217)
Stifling Innovation	-0.266
	(0.210)
Constant	-0.000
	(0.146)
Observations	999
R^2	0.089
Adjusted R^2	0.083
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 9: OLS Regression Estimates: Pooled Sample (Country Fixed Effects)

	Dependent variable:		
	Oversight (Q5)	Limit Imports (Q6)	Pass Laws (Q8)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Intercept	3.95***	3.92***	4.31***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Human rights	−0.05	−0.12	−0.06
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Mission creep	0.10	0.10	0.08
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Security justification	−0.10	−0.22***	−0.16**
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
China prompt	0.14*	0.13*	0.05
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Use against civil society	−0.12	−0.08	−0.06
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Unreliability & discrimination	−0.05	0.06	0.04
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Stifling Innovation	0.03	0.004	−0.07
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
US (vs UK)	−0.29***	−0.09**	−0.25***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Observations	2,000	2,000	2,000
R^2	0.03	0.02	0.03
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 10: OLS Regression Results: Change in Concern (Pooled Sample)

Human rights	0.517***
	(0.153)
Mission creep	0.342**
	(0.149)
Security justification	−0.411***
	(0.150)
China prompt	1.087***
	(0.148)
Use against civil society	0.478***
	(0.150)
Unreliability & discrimination	0.646***
	(0.152)
Stifling Innovation	0.118
	(0.151)
Constant	0.000
	(0.106)
Observations	1,999
R^2	0.060
Adjusted R^2	0.057
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT)

Table 11: US: Average Treatment Effects on the Treated on Federal Oversight Agency (Q5)

Treatment	N	Mean	Differences	P Value	T Statistic
Security justification	78	3.705128	+0.02	0.8576975	0.18
Unreliability & discrimination	77	3.714286	+0.03	0.8268830	0.22
Human rights	57	3.666667	-0.01	0.9394146	-0.08
China prompt	84	3.916667	+0.24	0.1039218	1.63
Mission creep	60	3.616667	-0.06	0.7128618	-0.37
Stifling Innovation	42	3.714286	+0.03	0.8494322	0.19
Use against civil society	55	3.636364	-0.04	0.7847559	-0.27
Control group	122	3.680328	–	NA	NA

Table 12: US: Average Treatment Effects on the Treated on Limiting Imports (Q6)

Treatment	N	Mean	Differences	P Value	T Statistic
Security justification	78	3.602564	-0.16	0.2359310	-1.19
Unreliability & discrimination	77	4.116883	+0.35 **	0.0128477	2.51
Human rights	57	3.666667	-0.10	0.5545495	-0.59
China prompt	84	4.119048	+0.36 ***	0.0043161	2.89
Mission creep	60	3.900000	+0.14	0.3860571	0.87
Stifling Innovation	42	3.952381	+0.19	0.2688456	1.11
Use against civil society	55	3.945454	+0.18	0.2333346	1.20
Control group	122	3.762295	–	NA	NA

Table 13: US: Average Treatment Effects on the Treated on Passing Laws (Q8)

Treatment	N	Mean	Differences	P Value	T Statistic
Security justification	78	4.038462	-0.01	0.9258203	-0.09
Unreliability & discrimination	77	4.337662	+0.29 **	0.0163194	2.43
Human rights	57	4.122807	+0.07	0.6028528	0.52
China prompt	84	4.309524	+0.26 **	0.0279767	2.21
Mission creep	60	4.166667	+0.12	0.4177437	0.81
Stifling Innovation	42	4.190476	+0.14	0.3242710	0.99
Use against civil society	55	4.163636	+0.11	0.4046128	0.84
Control group	122	4.049180	–	NA	NA

Table 14: UK: Average Treatment Effects on the Treated on Federal Oversight Agency (Q5)

Treatment	N	Mean	Differences	P Value	T Statistic
Stifling Innovation	53	4.094340	+0.17	0.1751739	1.36
Unreliability & discrimination	71	3.957746	+0.03	0.7928994	0.26
China prompt	76	4.092105	+0.17	0.1305325	1.52
Security justification	67	3.776119	-0.15	0.2536608	-1.15
Mission creep	86	4.162791	+0.24 **	0.0448123	2.02
Human rights	70	3.957143	+0.03	0.7826357	0.28
Use against civil society	50	4.080000	+0.15	0.2911452	1.06
Control group	136	3.926471	–	NA	NA

Table 15: UK: Average Treatment Effects on the Treated on Limiting Imports (Q6)

Treatment	N	Mean	Differences	P Value	T Statistic
Stifling Innovation	53	4.113207	+0.13	0.3407371	0.96
Unreliability & discrimination	71	4.014085	+0.03	0.8108377	0.24
China prompt	76	4.039474	+0.05	0.6665505	0.43
Security justification	67	3.746269	-0.24 *	0.0857347	-1.73
Mission creep	86	4.151163	+0.17	0.1348247	1.50
Human rights	70	3.871429	-0.11	0.3304394	-0.98
Use against civil society	50	3.780000	-0.21	0.1809041	-1.35
Control group	136	3.985294	–	NA	NA

Table 16: UK: Average Treatment Effects on the Treated on Passing Laws (Q8)

Treatment	N	Mean	Differences	P Value	T Statistic
Stifling Innovation	53	4.452830	+0.13	0.2600175	1.13
Unreliability & discrimination	71	4.478873	+0.16 *	0.0895107	1.71
China prompt	76	4.381579	+0.06	0.5199128	0.64
Security justification	67	4.179105	-0.14	0.1899753	-1.32
Mission creep	86	4.534884	+0.21 **	0.0146956	2.46
Human rights	70	4.300000	-0.02	0.8267020	-0.22
Use against civil society	50	4.520000	+0.20 *	0.0692501	1.84
Control group	136	4.323529	–	NA	NA

Subgroup Analysis: Party ID

Table 17: US: Average Treatment Effects on Oversight by Party ID (Q5)

Treatment	Party	N	Mean	Differences	P Value	T Statistic
Human rights	Democrat	45	3.622222	-0.30	0.1299463	-1.53
Human rights	Independent	34	3.735294	-0.02	0.9373838	-0.08
Human rights	Republican	32	3.531250	+0.30	0.2889369	1.07
Mission creep	Democrat	45	3.733333	-0.19	0.3221400	-1.00
Mission creep	Independent	39	3.564103	-0.19	0.5062167	-0.67
Mission creep	Republican	24	3.166667	-0.07	0.8188687	-0.23
Security justification	Democrat	42	3.857143	-0.07	0.6980390	-0.39
Security justification	Independent	44	3.340909	-0.42	0.1147444	-1.60
Security justification	Republican	30	3.666667	+0.43 *	0.0939560	1.71
China prompt	Democrat	54	4.296296	+0.37 **	0.0263451	2.26
China prompt	Independent	24	3.750000	-0.01	0.9772427	-0.03
China prompt	Republican	39	3.564103	+0.33	0.2267218	1.22
Use against civil society	Democrat	43	4.069767	+0.14	0.4023989	0.84
Use against civil society	Independent	33	3.242424	-0.52 *	0.0792874	-1.78
Use against civil society	Republican	32	3.281250	+0.05	0.8660552	0.17
Unreliability & discrimination	Democrat	57	3.771930	-0.15	0.4268354	-0.80
Unreliability & discrimination	Independent	29	3.551724	-0.21	0.4540778	-0.75
Unreliability & discrimination	Republican	34	3.470588	+0.24	0.4137254	0.82
Stifling Innovation	Democrat	43	3.976744	+0.05	0.7853540	0.27
Stifling Innovation	Independent	24	3.458333	-0.30	0.3149490	-1.01
Stifling Innovation	Republican	39	3.769231	+0.54 **	0.0382135	2.13
Control group	Democrat	41	3.926829	–	NA	NA
Control group	Independent	33	3.757576	–	NA	NA
Control group	Republican	30	3.233333	–	NA	NA

Table 18: US: Average Treatment Effects on Limiting Imports by Party ID (Q6)

Treatment	Party	N	Mean	Differences	P Value	T Statistic
Human rights	Democrat	45	3.777778	-0.12	0.5474986	-0.60
Human rights	Independent	34	3.735294	-0.17	0.4359438	-0.78
Human rights	Republican	32	3.781250	+0.15	0.5544305	0.59
Mission creep	Democrat	45	3.733333	-0.17	0.4122325	-0.82
Mission creep	Independent	39	3.871795	-0.04	0.8764589	-0.16
Mission creep	Republican	24	3.833333	+0.20	0.5157605	0.65
Security justification	Democrat	42	3.476190	-0.43 **	0.0320968	-2.18
Security justification	Independent	44	3.545454	-0.36 *	0.0970437	-1.68
Security justification	Republican	30	3.800000	+0.17	0.5054859	0.67
China prompt	Democrat	54	4.111111	+0.21	0.2324790	1.20
China prompt	Independent	24	4.125000	+0.22	0.3556423	0.93
China prompt	Republican	39	4.179487	+0.55 **	0.0302322	2.22
Use against civil society	Democrat	43	3.860465	-0.04	0.8243654	-0.22
Use against civil society	Independent	33	4.060606	+0.15	0.5076228	0.67
Use against civil society	Republican	32	3.812500	+0.18	0.5468811	0.61
Unreliability & discrimination	Democrat	57	3.824561	-0.08	0.6808403	-0.41
Unreliability & discrimination	Independent	29	3.862069	-0.05	0.8650197	-0.17
Unreliability & discrimination	Republican	34	4.088235	+0.45 *	0.0698067	1.85
Stifling Innovation	Democrat	43	3.744186	-0.16	0.4340944	-0.79
Stifling Innovation	Independent	24	3.875000	-0.03	0.8938158	-0.13
Stifling Innovation	Republican	39	3.923077	+0.29	0.2555264	1.15
Control group	Democrat	41	3.902439	–	NA	NA
Control group	Independent	33	3.909091	–	NA	NA
Control group	Republican	30	3.633333	–	NA	NA

Table 19: US: Average Treatment Effects on Passing Laws by Party ID (Q8)

Treatment	Party	N	Mean	Differences	P Value	T Statistic
Human rights	Democrat	45	4.000000	-0.10	0.6323824	-0.48
Human rights	Independent	34	4.294118	-0.01	0.9612634	-0.05
Human rights	Republican	32	3.875000	+0.17	0.4142409	0.82
Mission creep	Democrat	45	4.044444	-0.05	0.7712603	-0.29
Mission creep	Independent	39	3.923077	-0.38	0.1129786	-1.61
Mission creep	Republican	24	4.041667	+0.34	0.1693176	1.40
Security justification	Democrat	42	4.023809	-0.07	0.6890224	-0.40
Security justification	Independent	44	3.840909	-0.46 **	0.0198594	-2.38
Security justification	Republican	30	3.966667	+0.27	0.1785354	1.36
China prompt	Democrat	54	4.351852	+0.25	0.1369285	1.50
China prompt	Independent	24	4.208333	-0.09	0.6957219	-0.39
China prompt	Republican	39	4.153846	+0.45 **	0.0422270	2.07
Use against civil society	Democrat	43	4.162791	+0.07	0.7131853	0.37
Use against civil society	Independent	33	4.151515	-0.15	0.4566087	-0.75
Use against civil society	Republican	32	4.093750	+0.39 *	0.0910681	1.72
Unreliability & discrimination	Democrat	57	4.157895	+0.06	0.7404190	0.33
Unreliability & discrimination	Independent	29	3.965517	-0.34	0.1555490	-1.44
Unreliability & discrimination	Republican	34	4.029412	+0.33	0.1302415	1.53
Stifling Innovation	Democrat	43	4.255814	+0.16	0.3748630	0.89
Stifling Innovation	Independent	24	3.750000	-0.55 *	0.0642419	-1.91
Stifling Innovation	Republican	39	3.974359	+0.27	0.2015629	1.29
Control group	Democrat	41	4.097561	–	NA	NA
Control group	Independent	33	4.303030	–	NA	NA
Control group	Republican	30	3.700000	–	NA	NA

Table 20: UK: Average Treatment Effects on Oversight by Party ID (Q5)

Treatment	Party	N	Mean	Differences	P Value	T Statistic
Human rights	Conservative	21	3.666667	-0.12	0.6415430	-0.47
Human rights	Independent	33	3.818182	+0.01	0.9702147	0.04
Human rights	Labour	36	4.027778	+0.03	0.8893063	0.14
Human rights	Lib. Democrat	5	4.400000	+0.50	0.1212578	1.76
Mission creep	Conservative	29	4.137931	+0.35	0.1726912	1.38
Mission creep	Independent	33	3.969697	+0.16	0.4803729	0.71
Mission creep	Labour	43	4.279070	+0.28	0.1053725	1.64
Mission creep	Lib. Democrat	12	4.083333	+0.18	0.5445863	0.62
Security justification	Conservative	22	3.863636	+0.07	0.7957947	0.26
Security justification	Independent	37	3.675676	-0.14	0.5034175	-0.67
Security justification	Labour	36	3.805556	-0.19	0.3615843	-0.92
Security justification	Lib. Democrat	10	4.600000	+0.70 ***	0.0039193	3.22
China prompt	Conservative	27	3.925926	+0.13	0.5730128	0.57
China prompt	Independent	38	3.789474	-0.02	0.9098121	-0.11
China prompt	Labour	37	4.162162	+0.16	0.4020195	0.84
China prompt	Lib. Democrat	6	4.166667	+0.27	0.6120104	0.54
Use against civil society	Conservative	26	4.115385	+0.32	0.1417586	1.50
Use against civil society	Independent	30	3.866667	+0.06	0.8079774	0.24
Use against civil society	Labour	34	3.970588	-0.03	0.8752755	-0.16
Use against civil society	Lib. Democrat	6	2.833333	-1.07 **	0.0443293	-2.50
Unreliability & discrimination	Conservative	22	3.681818	-0.11	0.7089517	-0.38
Unreliability & discrimination	Independent	33	3.909091	+0.10	0.6551477	0.45
Unreliability & discrimination	Labour	37	3.972973	-0.03	0.8812058	-0.15
Unreliability & discrimination	Lib. Democrat	7	4.142857	+0.24	0.4336676	0.82
Stifling Innovation	Conservative	25	4.120000	+0.33	0.2004383	1.30
Stifling Innovation	Independent	43	3.813954	+0.00	0.9867295	0.02
Stifling Innovation	Labour	34	4.264706	+0.26	0.1691148	1.39
Stifling Innovation	Lib. Democrat	6	3.500000	-0.40	0.1644350	-1.51
Control group	Conservative	24	3.791667	–	NA	NA
Control group	Independent	37	3.810811	–	NA	NA
Control group	Labour	42	4.000000	–	NA	NA
Control group	Lib. Democrat	20	3.900000	–	NA	NA

Table 21: UK: Average Treatment Effects on Limiting Imports by Party ID (Q6)

Treatment	Party	N	Mean	Differences	P Value	T Statistic
Human rights	Conservative	21	3.952381	-0.01	0.9828811	-0.02
Human rights	Independent	33	3.727273	-0.16	0.4392246	-0.78
Human rights	Labour	36	3.555556	-0.47 **	0.0190945	-2.40
Human rights	Lib. Democrat	5	4.200000	+0.25	0.3908223	0.89
Mission creep	Conservative	29	4.379310	+0.42	0.1147475	1.61
Mission creep	Independent	33	4.212121	+0.32 *	0.0882442	1.73
Mission creep	Labour	43	4.023256	-0.00	0.9973363	-0.00
Mission creep	Lib. Democrat	12	4.166667	+0.22	0.4096565	0.84
Security justification	Conservative	22	3.909091	-0.05	0.8621262	-0.17
Security justification	Independent	37	3.729730	-0.16	0.3690592	-0.90
Security justification	Labour	36	3.722222	-0.30	0.1512341	-1.45
Security justification	Lib. Democrat	10	3.100000	-0.85 **	0.0223228	-2.50
China prompt	Conservative	27	4.111111	+0.15	0.5714546	0.57
China prompt	Independent	38	3.736842	-0.16	0.4324621	-0.79
China prompt	Labour	37	3.945946	-0.08	0.7008993	-0.39
China prompt	Lib. Democrat	6	3.833333	-0.12	0.8596782	-0.18
Use against civil society	Conservative	26	3.769231	-0.19	0.5070807	-0.67
Use against civil society	Independent	30	3.933333	+0.04	0.8419599	0.20
Use against civil society	Labour	34	3.588235	-0.44 **	0.0332868	-2.17
Use against civil society	Lib. Democrat	6	3.666667	-0.28	0.5614274	-0.61
Unreliability & discrimination	Conservative	22	4.090909	+0.13	0.6099133	0.51
Unreliability & discrimination	Independent	33	4.030303	+0.14	0.5079990	0.67
Unreliability & discrimination	Labour	37	3.891892	-0.13	0.4700599	-0.73
Unreliability & discrimination	Lib. Democrat	7	4.000000	+0.05	0.8939719	0.14
Stifling Innovation	Conservative	25	4.320000	+0.36	0.1716509	1.39
Stifling Innovation	Independent	43	3.581395	-0.31	0.1301826	-1.53
Stifling Innovation	Labour	34	4.058823	+0.04	0.8581761	0.18
Stifling Innovation	Lib. Democrat	6	3.333333	-0.62 *	0.0504178	-2.13
Control group	Conservative	24	3.958333	–	NA	NA
Control group	Independent	37	3.891892	–	NA	NA
Control group	Labour	42	4.023809	–	NA	NA
Control group	Lib. Democrat	20	3.950000	–	NA	NA

Table 22: UK: Average Treatment Effects on Passing Laws by Party ID (Q8)

Treatment	Party	N	Mean	Differences	P Value	T Statistic
Human rights	Conservative	21	3.761905	-0.57 *	0.0500892	-2.02
Human rights	Independent	33	4.272727	-0.08	0.6660762	-0.43
Human rights	Labour	36	4.361111	+0.10	0.5327726	0.63
Human rights	Lib. Democrat	5	4.200000	-0.10	0.6964371	-0.40
Mission creep	Conservative	29	4.517241	+0.18	0.3432622	0.96
Mission creep	Independent	33	4.454546	+0.10	0.5449491	0.61
Mission creep	Labour	43	4.488372	+0.23 *	0.0915196	1.71
Mission creep	Lib. Democrat	12	4.500000	+0.20	0.3503158	0.95
Security justification	Conservative	22	4.090909	-0.24	0.2996866	-1.05
Security justification	Independent	37	4.189189	-0.16	0.3531639	-0.93
Security justification	Labour	36	4.194444	-0.07	0.6946658	-0.39
Security justification	Lib. Democrat	10	4.200000	-0.10	0.7845340	-0.28
China prompt	Conservative	27	4.148148	-0.19	0.3666836	-0.91
China prompt	Independent	38	4.157895	-0.19	0.2587944	-1.14
China prompt	Labour	37	4.324324	+0.06	0.7202300	0.36
China prompt	Lib. Democrat	6	4.166667	-0.13	0.5582534	-0.60
Use against civil society	Conservative	26	4.230769	-0.10	0.6277270	-0.49
Use against civil society	Independent	30	4.233333	-0.12	0.5182852	-0.65
Use against civil society	Labour	34	4.264706	+0.00	0.9864789	0.02
Use against civil society	Lib. Democrat	6	3.166667	-1.13 *	0.0924443	-2.02
Unreliability & discrimination	Conservative	22	4.363636	+0.03	0.8846899	0.15
Unreliability & discrimination	Independent	33	4.545454	+0.19	0.2715786	1.11
Unreliability & discrimination	Labour	37	4.270270	+0.01	0.9579570	0.05
Unreliability & discrimination	Lib. Democrat	7	4.571429	+0.27	0.2971143	1.09
Stifling Innovation	Conservative	25	4.360000	+0.03	0.9142784	0.11
Stifling Innovation	Independent	43	4.209302	-0.14	0.4173902	-0.82
Stifling Innovation	Labour	34	4.352941	+0.09	0.6206581	0.50
Stifling Innovation	Lib. Democrat	6	4.333333	+0.03	0.9296310	0.09
Control group	Conservative	24	4.333333	–	NA	NA
Control group	Independent	37	4.351351	–	NA	NA
Control group	Labour	42	4.261905	–	NA	NA
Control group	Lib. Democrat	20	4.300000	–	NA	NA

Subgroup Analysis: Discrimination Status

Table 23: US: Average Treatment Effects on Oversight by Vulnerability (Q5)

Treatment	Vulnerability	N	Mean	Differences	P Value	T Statistic
Security justification	1	40	3.625000	-0.17	0.4686967	-0.73
Security justification	0	89	3.528090	-0.04	0.8005352	-0.25
Unreliability & discrimination	1	53	3.792453	+0.00	0.9921683	0.01
Unreliability & discrimination	0	76	3.486842	-0.08	0.6410933	-0.47
Human rights	1	46	3.326087	-0.46 **	0.0489211	-2.00
Human rights	0	73	3.794520	+0.23	0.1684455	1.39
Use against civil society	1	45	3.533333	-0.26	0.2632530	-1.13
Use against civil society	0	81	3.518518	-0.05	0.7654828	-0.30
China prompt	1	56	3.928571	+0.14	0.4940776	0.69
China prompt	0	75	3.893333	+0.33 **	0.0477644	2.00
Mission creep	1	47	3.659575	-0.13	0.5677585	-0.57
Mission creep	0	75	3.560000	-0.01	0.9690704	-0.04
Stifling Innovation	1	47	3.723404	-0.07	0.7601225	-0.31
Stifling Innovation	0	75	3.680000	+0.11	0.4849660	0.70
Control group	0	60	3.566667	–	NA	NA
Control group	1	62	3.790323	–	NA	NA

Table 24: US: Average Treatment Effects on Limiting Imports by Vulnerability (Q6)

Treatment	Vulnerability	N	Mean	Differences	P Value	T Statistic
Security justification	1	40	3.650000	-0.20	0.3260414	-0.99
Security justification	0	89	3.561798	-0.10	0.4556633	-0.75
Unreliability & discrimination	1	53	4.150943	+0.30	0.1400335	1.49
Unreliability & discrimination	0	76	3.723684	+0.06	0.7136018	0.37
Human rights	1	46	3.760870	-0.09	0.6682029	-0.43
Human rights	0	73	3.698630	+0.03	0.8252769	0.22
Use against civil society	1	45	4.133333	+0.28	0.1841639	1.34
Use against civil society	0	81	3.666667	+0.00	1.0000000	0.00
China prompt	1	56	4.196429	+0.34 *	0.0557565	1.93
China prompt	0	75	4.026667	+0.36 **	0.0148640	2.47
Mission creep	1	47	4.000000	+0.15	0.4641814	0.73
Mission creep	0	75	3.666667	+0.00	1.0000000	0.00
Stifling Innovation	1	47	4.085106	+0.23	0.2455417	1.17
Stifling Innovation	0	75	3.653333	-0.01	0.9309553	-0.09
Control group	0	60	3.666667	–	NA	NA
Control group	1	62	3.854839	–	NA	NA

Table 25: US: Average Treatment Effects on Passing Laws by Vulnerability (Q8)

Treatment	Vulnerability	N	Mean	Differences	P Value	T Statistic
Security justification	1	40	3.850000	-0.34 *	0.0572999	-1.93
Security justification	0	89	3.876405	-0.02	0.8573448	-0.18
Unreliability & discrimination	1	53	4.339623	+0.15	0.3933690	0.86
Unreliability & discrimination	0	76	3.881579	-0.02	0.8975221	-0.13
Human rights	1	46	4.173913	-0.02	0.9195569	-0.10
Human rights	0	73	3.917808	+0.02	0.8969863	0.13
Use against civil society	1	45	4.244444	+0.05	0.7712194	0.29
Use against civil society	0	81	3.950617	+0.05	0.7037227	0.38
China prompt	1	56	4.303571	+0.11	0.4969688	0.68
China prompt	0	75	4.213333	+0.31 **	0.0286241	2.21
Mission creep	1	47	4.170213	-0.02	0.8932426	-0.13
Mission creep	0	75	3.920000	+0.02	0.8954873	0.13
Stifling Innovation	1	47	4.000000	-0.19	0.2994710	-1.04
Stifling Innovation	0	75	3.920000	+0.02	0.8962887	0.13
Control group	0	60	3.900000	–	NA	NA
Control group	1	62	4.193548	–	NA	NA

Table 26: UK: Average Treatment Effects on Oversight by Vulnerability (Q5)

Treatment	Vulnerability	N	Mean	Differences	P Value	T Statistic
Stifling Innovation	1	48	3.979167	+0.05	0.7971884	0.26
Stifling Innovation	0	76	3.960526	+0.04	0.7647942	0.30
Unreliability & discrimination	1	52	3.903846	-0.03	0.8829468	-0.15
Unreliability & discrimination	0	59	3.864407	-0.06	0.6830035	-0.41
Use against civil society	1	44	3.818182	-0.11	0.5539621	-0.59
Use against civil society	0	79	3.848101	-0.08	0.5513627	-0.60
Security justification	1	50	3.940000	+0.01	0.9556035	0.06
Security justification	0	74	3.797297	-0.13	0.3598982	-0.92
China prompt	1	44	4.045454	+0.12	0.4879512	0.70
China prompt	0	90	3.933333	+0.01	0.9413698	0.07
Mission creep	1	42	4.119048	+0.19	0.3370651	0.97
Mission creep	0	93	4.225807	+0.30 **	0.0120192	2.54
Human rights	1	47	3.914894	-0.01	0.9340271	-0.08
Human rights	0	66	3.878788	-0.05	0.7381129	-0.34
Control group	0	79	3.924051	–	NA	NA
Control group	1	57	3.929825	–	NA	NA

Table 27: UK: Average Treatment Effects on Limiting Imports by Vulnerability (Q6)

Treatment	Vulnerability	N	Mean	Differences	P Value	T Statistic
Stifling Innovation	1	48	3.958333	-0.20	0.2710436	-1.11
Stifling Innovation	0	76	3.934210	+0.07	0.6066526	0.52
Unreliability & discrimination	1	52	4.057692	-0.10	0.5426330	-0.61
Unreliability & discrimination	0	59	3.915254	+0.05	0.7052286	0.38
Use against civil society	1	44	4.090909	-0.07	0.7035992	-0.38
Use against civil society	0	79	3.569620	-0.29 **	0.0360806	-2.11
Security justification	1	50	3.780000	-0.38 **	0.0349087	-2.14
Security justification	0	74	3.689189	-0.17	0.2510107	-1.15
China prompt	1	44	4.113636	-0.04	0.7994328	-0.25
China prompt	0	90	3.833333	-0.03	0.8474971	-0.19
Mission creep	1	42	4.285714	+0.13	0.4595907	0.74
Mission creep	0	93	4.096774	+0.24 *	0.0607383	1.89
Human rights	1	47	3.957447	-0.20	0.2683925	-1.11
Human rights	0	66	3.666667	-0.19	0.1662315	-1.39
Control group	0	79	3.860759	–	NA	NA
Control group	1	57	4.157895	–	NA	NA

Table 28: UK: Average Treatment Effects on Passing Laws by Vulnerability (Q8)

Treatment	Vulnerability	N	Mean	Differences	P Value	T Statistic
Stifling Innovation	1	48	4.083333	-0.25	0.1750652	-1.37
Stifling Innovation	0	76	4.394737	+0.08	0.4876666	0.70
Unreliability & discrimination	1	52	4.461538	+0.13	0.3447644	0.95
Unreliability & discrimination	0	59	4.305085	-0.01	0.9261714	-0.09
Use against civil society	1	44	4.295454	-0.04	0.8311905	-0.21
Use against civil society	0	79	4.126582	-0.19	0.1055519	-1.63
Security justification	1	50	4.120000	-0.21	0.1493116	-1.45
Security justification	0	74	4.243243	-0.07	0.5474536	-0.60
China prompt	1	44	4.204546	-0.13	0.3970223	-0.85
China prompt	0	90	4.233333	-0.08	0.4523176	-0.75
Mission creep	1	42	4.595238	+0.26 *	0.0602444	1.90
Mission creep	0	93	4.462366	+0.15	0.1434704	1.47
Human rights	1	47	4.255319	-0.08	0.6217940	-0.49
Human rights	0	66	4.227273	-0.09	0.4869021	-0.70
Control group	0	79	4.316456	–	NA	NA
Control group	1	57	4.333333	–	NA	NA